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Agraphical form of representation of delay hasbeen developed by the authors curve plottedagainst axes of time (months of activity) and
percentage of project completion (divided into plan-
ning and construction). Analysis of data from complet-
ed projects demonstrated an approximate 1:4 ratio
between the planning aspects of the project and the
construction. Thus a hydropower project development
curve could appear as in Fig. 1 (data adapted from a
real project example).  
When a project is delayed, its development curve
changes. The effective delay is longer than the initial
delay as the delay is compounded by further issues
which occur during the delay such as studies or per-
mits becoming outdated and the need for them to be
repeated or renewed (see Fig. 2).  
Using the same graphical format, a significant delay
during construction caused by a force majeure such as
a flood or a land-slip, or by unexpectedly poor geology,
may be represented as in Fig. 3. In cases of construc-
tion delay there are clear incentives to accelerate the
schedule after the delay, to recover time. These incen-
tives may include contractual penalties, such as liqui-
dated damages and increased interest during construc-
tion, or loss of profits. As a result, in contrast to the
experience of pre-construction delay, the final delay
may be less than the initial (effective) delay.
1. Case studies
The research used semi-structured interviews and
reviews of project documents to produce qualitative
inductive research using a methodology based on
‘grounded theory’ case study approach [Strauss and
Corbin 19981]. This methodology was particularly
appropriate given the lack of previous research in this
area [Creswell 20022].  
Case study examples were sought in developing
country contexts, where the project size was signifi-
cant compared with the national electricity system or
the project investment was large in comparison with
the national investment programme; as projects which
were ‘large’ in this sense have the most obvious wider
or secondary impacts of delay. Three case studies were
selected each of which experienced a significant delay
and each of which highlights the various impacts and
consequences of delay.  The projects analysed were the
Bujagali project in Uganda, The Nam Theun 2 project
in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR)
and the Arun III project in Nepal.
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Fig. 1. Typical project on schedule.
Fig. 2. Project on
schedule compared
with significant
pre-construction
delay.
Fig. 3. Project on
schedule compared
with significant
construction delay.
Construction of the Bujagali hydropower project in
Uganda was almost ready to begin in 2003 when, for a
variety of reasons, the developer pulled out, abandon-
ing a US$ 75 million investment.  It took five years to
get the project back to the point of starting construc-
tion. During this time, those who had moved as a result
of the project lived in ‘limbo’ between their old lives
and their new, relocated but not rehabilitated.
Meanwhile, the Government was forced to rely on
diesel generation to maintain electricity supplies to the
5 per cent of the population who had access to electric-
ity at that time and also increased withdrawals from
Lake Victoria to maintain supply from the existing
hydropower plants, in contravention of the riparian
agreements for using the Lake. The country lost the
expected project development benefit of 6 to 8 per cent
of development expenditure for the period of the delay. 
The Arun III project in Nepal began preparation in
the late 1980s and failed in 1994, just before financial
closure, largely because of difficulties over resettle-
ment caused by the access road. Notably, it was the
access road that attracted the local population to
favour the project, as the area was constrained by a
lack of access to markets and there was little invest-
ment in the local area. Communities in the project
areas lived in uncertainty for more than a decade and
remain in uncertainty as, despite a new attempt to
develop the project in 2009, construction has still not
yet begun. At a national level, the lack of electricity
continues to constrain development with winter power
cuts in excess of 16 hours a day. The development of
this project took such a long time with extended dis-
continuity of study that the institutional memory of the
project has been lost more than once, leading to ineffi-
ciency in its development.
The Nam Theun 2 project in Lao PDR was seeking
financial closure when the Asian financial crisis hit in
1997 and was at that time expected to be commis-
sioned in 2002. It took a further four years for prepa-
ration of the project and was fully commissioned in
2010. During this time the country was deprived of the
3 to 7 per cent of GDP expected to be generated by the
project. At the project site the area suffered from sig-
nificant over-logging during the delay as the area fell
between the protection of the developer and the
Government. The local communities tired of dis-
cussing the project in what seemed to them to be end-
less consultation with little action.  
Using the graphical format presented above and the
milestone data from the case studies, the delay was
graphically represented as shown in Figs. 4 to 6.  
2 Observed impacts
The timelines depicted above show that each of the
projects experienced significant delay (and Arun III
continues to be delayed) and each experienced differ-
ent impacts from the delay. The following section
summarizes the effects of delay observed in each proj-
ect with the aim of developing a typology for the
impacts of delay.  
2.1 Economic Impacts 
Time and cost overruns have become synonymous
with large infrastructure projects. The financial and
economic costs of delays during the planning phase
include direct and indirect economic impacts and
wasted or idle resources.   
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Fig. 4. Timeline for the Bujagali project.
Fig. 5. Timeline for the Arun III project.
Fig. 6. Timeline for the Nam Theun 2 project.
2.1.1 Direct economic impacts
Delay affects a project’s financial returns in that the
revenue streams start later. While it may be considered
that a project’s life remains 40 years, whether it com-
mences one year or the next, this seriously underesti-
mates the impact on a project’s financial performance
of late commencement. A project experiencing a two-
year delay may produce a net present value in current
currency terms that is 46 per cent lower than if it was
on schedule (based on a real project economic model
and a simple two year delay with no additional cost).
Further, if there is any seasonality to revenue streams,
such as a significant annual hydrological variation,
delay may mean that the project fails to capitalize on a
high water season of river flows and begins to gener-
ate only in a low water season with consequently
lower generation and revenue.
There are also wider economic effects. In construct-
ing an economic analysis of the impact of the project
on the national or regional economy, there is the impli-
cation that if the project is delayed, then so is the eco-
nomic benefit, but this is rarely analysed in detail.
However, the economic impacts can be greater than the
simple loss of economic gain. There may be other
impacts. In publicly funded projects, additional costs
may divert funds from other essential infrastructure
projects further down the pipeline, cascading the delay.
Resources may be reserved for a project that then fails
to materialize, effectively depriving other projects or
sectors of the use of those funds. There may also be
costs associated with meeting the shortfall in power
supply, such as extending the life of a station which
was scheduled for major refurbishment when the new
project came on stream, or installing short-term gener-
ation options such as diesel-powered units. Worse still,
countries may continue with many communities unable
to take advantage of electricity supply, affecting their
development opportunities and damaging the local
economy. In Uganda, the Government was forced to
subsidize power from privately installed diesel genera-
tion to ensure continued power supply. The direct costs
of this intervention and power outages were in the
region of US$ 110 million per year of delay, or 1 per
cent of GDP. In addition to this, there are secondary
impacts such as constraints to investment.  
Other direct impacts may include financial losses
from changed agreements. The Nam Theun II project
had a higher agreed price in its original power pur-
chase agreement in 1997 than in the current version,
thus there was a financial loss to Laos directly result-
ing from the delay, although Thailand received an
equal and opposite benefit. Economic costs of lost
multi-purpose benefits such as flood control may also
be significant. Dams have significant economic multi-
pliers [Bhatia et al 20083] giving indirect benefits that
are also lost or deferred along with the project.
2.1.2 Unserved energy
The economic and financial analysis of Bujagali estab-
lished an estimate of 93.92 GWh/year of unserved
energy in Uganda in 2005. This estimate is based on
power outages to connected consumers and does not
include the adverse effect on the development of those
as yet unconnected. The cost of this unserved energy is
calculated, using a weighted average of domestic and
non-domestic demand, as US$ 0.229 /kWh [Power
Planning, 20074].  
Nepal, suffers from 16 hour a day power cuts in win-
ter, which constrain its development and add addition-
al burden to the industry of using diesel back-up gen-
eration. A study by USAID in 2003 estimated the loss
to Nepal’s industrial sector of power cuts to be US$
24.7 million a year or 4.43 per cent of industrial sector
GDP [USAID 20035]. The extent of power outages has
significantly increased since this study was conducted.  
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Sardar Saravor dam, India (part of the Narmada Basin development)
Opposition by the populace led to a court decision that
delayed the dam for five years. During this time, the interest 
during construction, and lost power generation and irrigation 
benefits were estimated to exceed US$ 1 billion [World Bank 
20039].
Fig. 7. Bujagali project development curve.
Fig. 8.  Arun III project development curve.
Fig. 9. Nam Theun 2
project development
curve.
2.1.3 Local economic impacts
Local villages close to the project site gain local
employment and income generating opportunities
from a hydropower project. Local people can rent out
rooms, or provide taxi or food services and the local
market for produce increases. Petty contracts below a
certain size are often reserved for those affected by the
project and skilled labourers can get work on the proj-
ect itself. When the project is delayed these benefits
fail to materialize. Those resettled for the Bujagali
project felt let down that they had moved, partly in
expectation of such local economic benefits and the
project had failed to materialise [Burnside 20066].
2.1.4 Limits of traditional project analysis
The limitation of traditional project analysis techniques
for consideration of delay is made clear by considering
the economic rate of return of a project. The World
Bank Stakeholder Sourcebook notes that a two-year
stakeholder participation process has a relatively minor
cost of US$ 9 million, equivalent to the cost of a four-
month delay in construction [World Bank 20037]. It
thus asserts that a two-year delay to carry out extensive
consultation is justified, so long as it saves at least four
months of construction delay that might have occurred
as a result of stakeholder concerns. It also notes that the
impact on the economic rate of return of the project for
such a two-year process costing US$ 2 million per year
would be only to reduce it from 13.18 per cent to 12.59
per cent. However, such analysis does not reflect the
local costs or the delayed benefits.
Even the extent of the economic impact appears to be
understated. This can be demonstrated by considering
a hypothetical 400 MW hydropower project with a 60
month construction schedule; costing US$ 400 million
capital cost and yielding benefits over more than 20
years, giving an economic rate of return of 14.5 per
cent. If the schedule for this project is delayed by two
years and US$ 4 million is spent in each of these years
on additional studies, the economic rate of return of
the project reduces to 13.2 per cent, not apparently a
very significant drop (although greater than that noted
in the previous paragraph). However, the net present
value of benefits in the two cases varies from US$ 57
million to US$ 37 million, a 35 per cent fall. If the
project cost also increases by 10 per cent, then the net
present value of benefits falls to US$ 14 million and
economic rate of return of 11.8 per cent (see Table 1),
constructed by reflecting delay in a real project eco-
nomic analysis). This analysis does not include any
secondary implications from the delay in power sup-
plies and other benefits. 
Thus, when considering the need for further studies
or consultation, a simple comparison of the economic
rate of return of the project under the two scenarios is
not sufficient to give a clear assessment to stakehold-
ers of the economic impacts. When considering an
apparently ‘small’ decrease in the economic rate of
return, it is also important to consider the rate of return
of the next best project alternative from the least-cost
development plan and ensure that the project remains
optimal. This is not to suggest that additional consul-
tation or studies should not be carried out, but a recog-
nition that the true cost of doing so may provide incen-
tives to carry out the work without any unnecessary
delay.
2.1.5 Waste of resources  
The impacts noted above are less severe for countries
that can afford to develop more than one project at once.
Countries such as China and India may be able to accept
a delay on one project as the risk is spread over a large
set of projects [Head 20008]. But for many countries, a
single project may be all they can realistically pursue,
even during the planning phase, as resources for project
planning are scarce. If one project is delayed, then it
may be very difficult and time-consuming to mobilize
funds to commence studies for a ‘Plan B’ (next best
project). Yet least-cost development studies for power
planning tend to assume that it is possible to switch
seamlessly to plan B in the event of a problem.  
One of the criticisms of the Arun project was that it
was too large an investment for Nepal. It was sug-
gested that Nepal would be better off developing its
small and medium-size hydropower resources. As an
experiment in ‘switching to Plan B’ the difficulties are
clear from Nepal’s experience. The switch from a sin-
gle fully prepared project to a large number of small,
but unprepared projects, meant that the funds allocat-
ed by the international financial institutions for Arun
could not easily be reallocated. Indeed, despite the
World Bank’s promise in 1995 to retain its US$ 175
million commitment to Nepal it took until 2003
[World Bank 20039] to approve a credit for private
sector development of small and medium hydropow-
er. This project was restructured in 2008 because of its
failure to attract investors and the private hydropower
fund reduced from US$ 35.5 million to US$ 9.2 mil-
lion [World Bank 200810]. Of the five other financiers
involved in Arun III, only KfW (German
Development Bank) funding was successfully trans-
ferred to another power project. It is suggested that
even for a medium-size project (50 MW) the time
from preparation to commissioning in Nepal is 6 to 10
years [Mahat 200111] making switching a time con-
suming exercise.  
2.1.6 Cost of repetition or update of out-of-date studies
A common feature of long-delayed planning is the
necessity to repeat or update studies. In some cases
information becomes out of date as technology has
developed, or even the hydrology of a river has
changed (possibly as a result of upstream develop-
ments); social surveys need to be updated and the stud-
ies need to comply with whatever new international
benchmarks are applicable. This adds significantly to
the cost of project preparation, compared with a
smooth project preparation plan. The first attempt at
Bujagali cost AES $75 million (for the planning and
minor infrastructure and resettlement activities which
it undertook) in addition to which the Government of
Uganda had invested time and resources. There is an
argument that the project may be better planned hav-
ing been studied twice and meeting higher (more
recent) standards, but there remains significant dupli-
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Table 1: Comparison of economic rate of return of project on schedule and delayed
Project cost 
(US$ million)
Net Present Value 
(US$ million at 
12 per cent 
discount rate)
Economic 
rate of return
(per cent)
Project on schedule 380 57 14.5
Project with two year delay 389 37 13.2
Project with two year delay 
and 10 per cent increase in cost 427 14 11.8
cation of effort in these studies. World Bank advice to
staff on dealing with projects which have legacy issues
from the past suggests that project studies (depending
on the original quality) will need: minimal review if
less than one year old; detailed review and publication
with supplementary information if between one and
three years old; and, updating and further consultation
if between three and five years old. Studies more than
five years old should be completely revised and sub-
ject to full consultation and disclosure [World Bank
200912].
2.1.7 Linked projects 
Projects of the size considered here do not stand alone
and must be connected to the national grid, by a major
transmission line. Such transmission lines are con-
structed based on the estimated time of completion of
the power station and can thus stand idle if the project
is significantly delayed (this is largely an issue of con-
struction delay). In addition, some projects may be
associated with the development of a particular indus-
try; for example, hydropower plants are often used to
provide power to heavy industry such as an aluminium
smelter. If the associated investments proceed, but the
powerplant is delayed, then the plant may be unable to
operate or earn revenue. Such idle assets are a waste of
resources.    
2.1.8 Cost increases 
For transport projects, each additional year of imple-
mentation adds approximately 4.6 per cent, above
inflation, to the project cost [Flyvbjerg et al. 200413].
In the case studies above, each new project incarnation
increased the cost. In some cases this reflects the fact
that further study has removed some of the optimism
bias from the cost estimates, or there may be true cost
increases such as increases in raw material prices.
However, there are also indications that delayed proj-
ects may appear more risky, and so contractors may
add an additional risk premium to their prices. In the
case of Bujagali, the project cost doubled. This impact
was carefully analysed and found to be a legitimate
cost of the increase in raw material prices in the mid
2000s and other factors [World Bank 200714]. A survey
of 43 hydropower projects found that respondents rec-
ognized that price had increase by more than inflation
during a delay [Plummer Braeckman and Guthrie
201515]. 
2.2 Environmental impacts 
Delays to projects can also add additional environ-
mental impacts, possibly even in excess of the adverse
impacts expected from the project itself. Environ
-mental benefits such as flood control and water con-
servation may also be lost during the period of the
delay.
2.2.1 Lack of environmental protection
In countries where the level of environmental protec-
tion provided by the relevant state agencies may be
less than ideal, dam sites tend to lose out in the alloca-
tion of protection resources. The rationale for this is
that the dam site will eventually need to be cleared so
there is less of a requirement for protection. There is
also an assumption that the project authorities will take
care of environmental protection, even if they are not
yet in place. Thus when a project is delayed, the area
may suffer adverse impacts.  
At the Nam Theun 2 project, a member of one of the
expert panels for the project noted that the project area
suffered from accelerated deforestation (at ten times
former levels) until logging was restricted as part of
the project environmental management plan [Scudder
200516]. As a result of this over-logging, some of the
local forest areas are degraded and the project-affected
communities find the additional difficulty of lack of
access to forest products on which they previously
depended. The project has environmental protection
responsibilities with 3500 km2 of the Nakai Plateau
being protected under the project’s environmental
management plan and control placed on logging in the
project site and catchment area [NTPC 200917]. The
project brought with it significant environmental pro-
tection. Thus the longer the project took to prepare, the
longer the area suffered from lack of this environmen-
tal protection. 
2.2.2 Consequential environmental impacts
There can be significant consequential environmental
impacts of project delays depending on what the coun-
tries’ alternative energy and water sources are.
Countries which rely on fossil fuel generation while
awaiting a hydropower project may be creating signif-
icant unnecessary CO2 and other emissions. Uganda,
while waiting for Bujagali, was dependent largely on
diesel generation to meet (or attempt to meet) the
growing energy demand. Uganda has 150 MW of pri-
vately owned diesel generation and many businesses
and private homes use individual diesel generators for
personal energy back-up. Estimates (see box) show
that Uganda emitted more than a million tonnes of CO2
during the period 2006 to 2011 by using diesel when it
might otherwise have been using power from Bujagali.
While this amount is not significant in a global con-
text, it does represent a significant proportion of
Uganda’s emissions (approximately 28 per cent of the
total 2007 according to the Carbon Dioxide
Information Analysis Center, and is an underestimate
given that it does not account for the private use of
diesel generators, which are possibly less efficient and
more polluting than large scale diesel generation.
The flows from Lake Victoria into the Victoria Nile
which are used for generation at the Nalubaale and
Kiira hydropower complex are subject to an ‘agreed
curve’ of abstraction defined by the downstream ripar-
ians. This agreement attempts to mimic the natural
flow levels such that there is no adverse impact on the
downstream riparians and the Lake levels are main-
tained. There are many factors that affect the lake
level, but in 2006 the lake reached its lowest level
since 1923 through a combination of regional drought
and Uganda’s urgent need for electricity, which led to
an over-withdrawal of water from Lake Victoria.
Water supply infrastructure, docks and fish landings
were left high and dry, fish stocks were affected and
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Calculation of CO2 emmissions in Uganda, while waiting for Bujugali
Diesel generation 2006-2011 4495 GWh
CO2 emissions per kWh 249 g/kWh
Emissions 2006-2011 1.1 × 106 t CO2
Note: These figures only reflect large-scale generation and 
does not include amounts from the use of personal and local
diesel generators.
shallow parts of the lake experienced high concentra-
tions of pollutants. The impacts were felt variously
across the three riparian countries of Uganda, Kenya
and Tanzania and by the 30 million people who use the
lake [World Bank 200818].  
Had the Bujagali project been in place according to
its original schedule of 2005, the additional power sup-
ply could have allowed Uganda to avoid the necessity
of overdrawing the water thus avoiding some of the
harm to the other riparians.    
3.3 Social Impacts 
3.3.1 Local impacts of uncertainty  
Over the past 20 years, the understanding has signifi-
cantly improved of the impacts of large infrastructure
on the communities directly affected. Analysis now
focuses on resettlement and rehabilitation not just in
terms of compensation, but also in establishing alter-
native income streams and sharing benefits. Yet there
is little consideration of the impacts of ‘waiting’ to be
resettled, sometimes in excess of ten years. During this
time, the affected family cannot sell its house or
extend its property (as compensation is fixed on the
structure assessed in the social survey) and people’s
ability to take up alternative employment elsewhere is
constrained by the need to establish continued residen-
cy to qualify for compensation and benefits. Whole
villages start to lose out in the local battle for resources
for infrastructure and school provision because it does
not make sense for a local authority to invest in a vil-
lage which is shortly to be inundated; but with project
delays the village may live in this resource-constrained
situation for years, with consequent damage to health
and community relations. 
In developed countries, there are schemes to assist
areas affected by ‘planning blight’ including damage
to property values that occurs with proximity to pro-
posed major infrastructure projects. These schemes
guarantee the householder some proportion of the pre-
project value of the property. Generally, in developing
countries, no such schemes exist to allow a project-
affected family to extricate itself from a project area
while still ensuring that it receives the proposed reset-
tlement and rehabilitation benefits. Once resettlement
is suggested and the baseline survey is established, vil-
lagers no longer have any incentive to invest in their
property or maintain the village infrastructure. The
World Commission on Dams particularly notes the
impact on villages as soon as a project site is identified
when a form of ‘planning blight’ descends on the area
with governments, businesses, farmers and others
reluctant to make any investment in the area. As a
result, the report notes that communities can “live for
decades starved of development and welfare invest-
ments”. The report goes on to express concern about
the fear experienced by those living in designated dam
sites for extended periods. The impacts of such stress
are difficult to quantify but none-the-less real for the
affected families [WCD 200019]. Conversely, there are
areas where the price of land increases once a project
is notified, as there is speculation that the compensa-
tion for land will be significantly higher than its agri-
cultural value. This can lead to speculation in land and
may result in villagers receiving a price from a specu-
lator much lower than their expected compensation.
Social disarticulation or the breaking down of socie-
tal and community structures as a consequence of
involuntary resettlement, is a risk in all resettlement
programmes [Cernea 200420]. However, it is apparent
that this process of social disarticulation begins even
before the resettlement actually begins, with the
impacts the villages begin to experience once an area
is designated for development. Campaigning against a
project can give a village a common focus, but it can
also change the social equilibrium.
3.3.2 Local impacts of reduced services  
Communities in project development areas tend to lose
access to public services and assistance as it is
assumed that in some way the project is taking care of
them. Thus communities can fall between the local
Government and the developer (who is not yet on site
owing to the delay). The National Association of
Professional Environmentalists noted in its press
release on AES withdrawal that the communities in the
Bujagali Falls scheme area have been ‘in limbo for
years’ because of the project and that it was time more
help was given to the communities [NAPE 200321].
The delays to Nam Theun’s implementation were con-
sidered to be a direct cause of the impoverishment of
the people of the area [Scudder 200516].  
3.3.3 Absence of infrastructure gains  
Hydropower projects often bring with them local
infrastructure benefits such as roads and bridges.
These can benefit the surrounding villagers who have
improved access to markets. It can also open access to
newcomers and imported products into villages that
have previously lived in isolation, bringing competi-
tion into local markets, which the local residents may
not appreciate. Vidyut magazine, published in Nepal,
quotes a conversation between World Bank Vice
President Joseph Woods and a Sherpa from the
Chepuwa Village near the Chinese border concerning
his expectations from the Arun III project. Asked for
his views, the Sherpa is reported to have said, “Well,
sir, once the road is built up to Num, then we need not
carry our annual bag of salt for seven days from Hile”
[Spotlight 200422]. Indeed, many villagers cited the
access road rather than the hydropower project as
their biggest reason for supporting the project.
Although some road development has taken place in
the past decade, the road has not reached Chepuwa
and the villagers still need to walk for many days to
buy salt. 
3.3.4 Encroachment and changes to baseline survey
Some dam sites suffer from encroachment by people
moving into the area in the hope of obtaining compen-
sation for resettlement. During the delay to the
Bujagali project, the site was protected from encroach-
ment by fencing and watch patrols, and no significant
encroachment took place [Burnside 20066]. However,
many prospective dam sites are not so well protected
and encroachment by those seeking a share in the
expected compensation is not uncommon, particularly
when project timelines are extended. To try to avoid
encroachers, social surveys are often carried out early
in the project’s planning process. However, when a
delay is encountered there are calls for the social sur-
vey to be updated, to take account, for example, of any
increases in household size. The process of reassess-
ment reopens the question of encroachers who may
indeed have been living on the site for some years and
yet are regarded as interlopers by the original local
community.  
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As is pointed out in the thematic review on resettle-
ment prepared for the WCD, “any delay between a sur-
vey of ’households’ and project development, or evac-
uation or compensation, runs the risk that those affect-
ed will be different from those surveyed” [Adams
200023]. As time passes, households change through
births, marriages, deaths or other family events, so the
composition of the household originally surveyed may
be very different from that currently in place.  
The WCD guideline on the conduct of baseline social
surveys notes that the assessment of affected households
should be updated if the time between the conduct of the
original detailed baseline and the project’s actual imple-
mentation is extended. It suggests that the baseline is
updated at the tender stage (although significant delays
can occur even after tender), but does not give any guid-
ance on how to deal with the question of encroachment.  
One documented consequence of project site desig-
nation is that the communities cease to invest in their
property as soon as development is anticipated. If the
baseline survey is carried out much later than this
point, or is substantially delayed, the assets of the
community may be valued lower by the assessor as
they have fallen into disrepair. This second-order
effect on affected communities was noted in the les-
sons learned from NT2 [World Bank 200624].
3.3.5 Partial or incomplete resettlement 
In some cases, the delay occurs once the resettlement
process has already begun. This can leave affected
families, caught between their old lives and their new
lives and without promised support in the difficult
adjustments to a new resettlement site. At Bujagali,
AES carried out a resettlement programme, which
offered (according to Ugandan law) either a replace-
ment house or cash compensation. Many of the affect-
ed families opted for cash rather than a house (51 of
the 85 families who lost houses) and despite training
by AES on managing money and developing liveli-
hoods; much of the money was spent on non-produc-
tive uses rather than being invested in assets to
improve livelihoods. Those who did opt for a house
are reasonably satisfied with the housing and pleased
to have formal title to the property, but the promised
infrastructure facilities such as a school for the reset-
tled community, fishing piers and protected water
sources, were not completed. The affected families
complain that they accepted the compensation in the
hope that they would get not just the resettlement
package, but also longer-term opportunities such as
employment directly or indirectly associated with the
dam and improved fishing once the dam was com-
plete. They feel let down by the failure of the project
to proceed, “We voluntarily surrendered our lands to
the dam… while the dam… did not keep its promis-
es” [Burnside 20066].
The World Bank Inspection Panel report [World
Bank 200818] notes that the analysis of resettlement
impacts for the second project, “did not include an
evaluation of the impact of the delay on the socio-eco-
nomic conditions of the project”. The panel was con-
cerned that the livelihoods of the people affected by
the project had been adversely affected by the delay
and that the families were “essentially left in limbo”.
The panel findings include the failure to employ a
“methodology for restitution of the unintended socio-
economic costs incurred by displaced persons result-
ing from project stoppage/delay”.   
3.3.6 Impact on the unserved 
At a national or regional level, villages awaiting elec-
trification are denied the health, education and devel-
opment benefits associated with the electricity.
Estimates of ‘unserved energy’ are frequently limited
to the restriction of power supplies to those already
connected, but the cost to those with no connection can
be even greater. These costs are rarely laid at the door
of the delayed project.  
3.3.7 Consultation fatigue 
Another issue with extended times for project prepara-
tion is that stakeholders can become weary of the
whole consultation process and simply not be able to
maintain the interest in continuing to attend meetings
or feel that they have to agree to whatever is suggest-
ed simply to reach some conclusion to the process.
This has been described as ‘consultation fatigue’
[Diduck and Sinclair 200225]. At the Nam Theun 2
project, The Economist records that villagers were
becoming frustrated with the consultation process “as
the latest delegation passes through, one of the locals
wheeled out to meet it complains that he has attended
14 such consultations in the past two years. When, he
asks, will his grand visitors make a decision?” [The
Economist 200326]. This was two years before the
decision to start the project was finally taken. Such
weariness with the process may lead communities to
appear indifferent to the outcome and thus lose out in
the bargaining process of setting the resettlement and
rehabilitation terms.  
3.4 Institutional issues 
3.4.1 Institutional memory
Lengthy planning processes can lead to a loss of insti-
tutional memory for a project. Staff may move on
through a process of regular rotation (as in
Government Departments), or retire or shift to projects
which look more likely to be successful. Aid agency
staff, financiers, consultants, advisers and even com-
munity leaders may change. As a result, the memory of
the evolution of the project is lost, since documenta-
tion of the process is generally poor. Ultimately, when
no one can remember why the project took a particular
course, there may be need for additional studies,
analysis or consultation to revaluate earlier decisions. 
3.4.2 Decision making and governance
Public sector employees are increasingly under a
microscope of concern for corruption. Their incentives
are to avoid any implication that they have favoured
another party (particularly a private sector party). As a
result they award contracts to the lowest bidder, even
if they are concerned that the bidder does not have the
capability to carry out a contract to time. In India, the
concept of ‘vigilance’ (anti-corruption) is ever threat-
ening, with careers lost over a minor suggestion of
malfeasance. However, vigilance officers are not
taught to consider the impact of delay. As a conse-
quence, decisions that cause delay may be taken with
impunity despite huge cost implications (see box).  
3.4.3 Country reputation
A country may get a reputation for being unable to
implement projects on time and this may disincline
developers to pick up subsequent projects. Lao PDR for
example had many other potential hydropower export
projects, but was unable to bring any of them to financial
Hydropower & Dams    Issue Two, 2016 111
closure while NT2 remained in abeyance. NT2 was sim-
ply too high profile, but since 2005 when NT2 reached
closure, Laos has advanced several other projects.
Similarly, Nepal has had difficulty in bringing export
projects to fruition, partly because of national security
concerns, but also because long outstanding projects like
Arun III and West Seti give the impression that the coun-
try must be a difficult one in which to operate. 
Similarly, it seems that the number of bidders for any
particular hydropower project’s contracts may be
affected by the perception of delay associated with the
country’s projects. As was noted in the Barker Review
of Land Use Planning in the UK, fewer bidders bid for
infrastructure contracts where delays are likely and
this tends to be only the largest firms who have the
financial strength to cope with expensive preparation
processes and long delays [Barker 200627]. Nepal, for
example, bid out three major projects at one time
(Arun III, Upper Karnali and Budi Gandaki) and the
latter received no bids. In an industry survey of barri-
ers to hydropower development in Nepal, one respon-
dent said “there is possibly a psychological barrier:
when the World Bank pulled out of Arun III this creat-
ed a loss of confidence in the sector. If a major devel-
opment bank could not resolve the issues surrounding
hydropower development, no one could” [BPI 200928].
3.5 Summary 
The typology given in Table 2 characterizes the effects
based on the following four main categories of eco-
nomic and financial, environmental, social, and insti-
tutional aspects. Within each of these categories, the
effects are divided between local effects that are large-
ly focused on the project area and its surroundings and
wider impacts that have an impact on the country or
region. The list in Table 2 considers the adverse effects
of delay. It is possible for there to be some positive
effects (benefits) of delay; indeed sometimes the very
cause of delay is the need for further study in one area
of the project, which should lead to enhanced out-
comes in that area, such as a further environmental
study.                                                                      ◊
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